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FAILED ECONOMIC TAKE-OFFS AND 
TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN
 






What are the causes of terrorism? Of the various theories put forth, the analy-
sis below suggests that failed economic take-offs, in addition to the usual
factors suggested, are an important element. This finding has a number of
implications for Pakistan’s economic reform programs. In addition, foreign aid
programs to the country will have to be modified if their effectiveness in




During the 1990s, PakistanÕs economy suffered on two
accounts. First, civilian ruling elites lacked a vision to make efÞcient use of
public Þnancial resources to boost economic growth, contain poverty, and de-
velop human resources. Second, their governments (led, respectively, by
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) were unable to check unbridled corruption
and cronyism. This failure resulted in the political use of public resources, the
bending of rules and regulations to beneÞt a select few, and the erosion of in-
stitutional accountability. Four key economic breakdowns evolved out of this
environment: (1) high Þscal deÞcits, (2) unsustainable public debt (domestic
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and foreign), (3) a sharp deterioration in the distribution of income, and (4) a








Under the Musharraf administration, led by General Pervez Musharraf,
considerable progress was made in correcting 1 and 2 above, but possibly at
the expense of a sizable increase in the number of people living below the
poverty line. In part, economic performance under Musharraf stems from
the emphasis placed, over the past three years, on macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion as a key to Þghting poverty. This strategy hinges on the premise that sta-
bility will result in higher rates of investment, eventually restoring the growth




 achieved during the 1960s and through most of
the 1980s. In turn, high growth will pull large segments of the population over
the poverty line. The hope is that, in the near future, sustained growth rates of
over 6% will again be the norm.
Is this a realistic goal for the Pakistani economy? Historically, Pakistan
grew faster than the South Asian average by an average of 2% in the 1960s




 Since 1993, PakistanÕs
growth has been below the regional average. In contrast, after starting slowly,
growth in South Asia as a whole has been steadily accelerating for four de-
cades. In short, with the exception of a spurt in the 1980s, growth trends in
Pakistan have been steadily slowing since the 1960s from very high initial









 (1960) senseÑindustrialization was proceeding rapidly
and the agricultural sector was experiencing a revolution in productivity gains.
To a lesser extent, the 1980s also represents a failed take-off.
In the short run, continuing with the International Monetary FundÕs (IMF)
macro-stabilization program is probably the best thing the country can do to
restore investor conÞdence. In this regard, at present there are the beginnings
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However, in the longer term, the country must address its domestic terrorism
problem if it is to draw high, sustainable amounts of foreign investment.
Given this background, the sections below address the following questions:
What factors appear to limit rapid, sustained growth in Pakistan? Have these
changed signiÞcantly over time? Is the increase in domestic terrorism and




 related to past patterns of economic
growth and development? If so, is it possible for the United States and other
donor nations to construct an aid strategy for Pakistan capable of simulta-
neously attacking the countryÕs two greatest contemporary problems, increas-
ing terrorism and an underperforming economy?
 
Factors Underlying Pakistan’s Patterns of 
Failed Take-offs and Decline
 
The main factors underlying PakistanÕs growth are increased supplies of labor
and capital along with overall efÞciency, or total factor productivity (TFP).
Changes in TFP represent increased efÞciency brought about by market-ori-
ented economic reforms, more competition, increased globalization, innova-
tion, and technology transfer owing to increased foreign direct investment.
Conversely, declines in TFP can come about because of such factors as erosion
in governance, increased protectionism, a slowdown in globalization, and cor-
ruption. As a standard for comparison, about half of the growth in the industrial
democracies stems from TFP. Economies isolated from the global economy,
such as the former Soviet Union and the Latin American economies at the height
of their import substitution policies in the 1960s, derived no growth from TFP.





 The IMF found that for 1961—2001 as a whole, Pakistan experi-
enced only moderate TFP growth (0.5% annually). This Þnding suggests that
most of the countryÕs growth can be accounted for by increased amounts of labor
and capital, with efÞciency gains playing a relatively minor role. An interesting
pattern emerges when looking at sub-periods. In the 1960s, PakistanÕs TFP ex-




2.2%). Beginning in the 1970s, TFP
growth became positive, peaking in the 1980s (2.4%), only to become negative








The IMF attributes PakistanÕs strong growth performance of 6.6% per annum
in the 1960s to rapid increases in investment, both physical and human. Many
 








Pakistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix
 
 (Washington, D.C.: International Mone-
tary Fund, November 2002), ch. II.
 774
 
ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIV, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2004
 
observers point to the 1960s as the period of the countryÕs greatest economic
success, resulting in a Rostow-type take-off for the economy. However, there





addition to low rates of domestic savings that forced an eventual decline in in-
vestment, the rapid growth of the 1960s was not broad-based. More tellingly,
it generated a great deal of economic tension: Regional and class inequalities
increased, while large segments of the population experienced falling stan-
dards of living. The concentration of incomes was particularly disturbing.
Twenty-two families owned 66% of industry, 97% of the insurance sector, and
80% of banking. Only 0.1% of landlords owned 500 acres or more, yet they
owned 15% of PakistanÕs total land.
It is likely that a number of other factors contributed to the termination of
rapid growth in the 1960s. In particular, the high share of the countryÕs resources
allocated to defense is often cited as creating a drag on economic growth, ulti-




 Empirical research sheds some
light on this issue. Since independence, defense expenditures have had periods
of both negative and positive impact on the countryÕs overall rate of economic
growth. The periods of negative impact occurred mainly from 1958—73 and,
no doubt, stemmed from short-run accelerations in expenditures to counter In-





 These spurts in increased allocations to the military most likely
diverted critical resources from the civilian sector, thus reducing the overall
rate of growth. At least in a statistical sense, these patterns have not been
present on a signiÞcant scale since the 1971 war.
Over the longer term, defense expenditures no doubt place a damper on the
economy, making take-offs harder to initiate and sustain through the coopta-
tion of resources that would ordinarily be available for growth-enhancing in-
vestments. For instance, the literature has identiÞed a link between defense




 SpeciÞcally, defense expenditures in Pakistan




 This effect has
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shifted over time. The countryÕs allotment to the military clearly expanded ex-
ternal debt in 1958—73. But since 1973, this link has weakened and, if any-
thing, the debt accrued in the earlier period is currently acting as a constraining
force on the countryÕs allocations to the military. In effect, the debt accrued
through defense expenditures has reduced the overall ßexibility of govern-
ment Þnances, making it even more difÞcult to sustain high rates of growth.
Finally, to the extent that defense expenditures have led to increased Þscal
deÞcits, educational expenditures have suffered directlyÑeducation spending
and the countryÕs Þscal deÞcit are negatively associated. Austerity in educa-





 Over time, the deterioration in PakistanÕs system of higher





The 1970s were a turbulent time in PakistanÕs history, as the administration of
ZulÞkar Ali Bhutto attempted to correct some of the distortions noted above.
Perhaps because this was such an uncertain time, there were declines in the
growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) and almost all factor inputs.
Causation is always difÞcult to sort out in the social sciencesÑdo political
crises cause poor economic performance or do ßoundering economies result
in political crises, or are the two interrelated through some sort of feedback
mechanism? Whatever the chain of linkages, Shahid Javed Burki notes that a
recurring pattern in Pakistani politics is that democracies fail because they are
not able to
 
design a set of institutions that could prevail over the interest of a narrow elite. The
Þrst experiment with democracy, from 1947 to 1958, ßoundered as a result of a con-
ßict between two social groups that sought to dominate the political stage. The Þrst
group had worked hard to create Pakistan. Most of the people who belonged to it
lived outside the boundaries of the new country; a signiÞcant number of them
migrated to Pakistan once the country was born; and once there they began to com-
pete with the indigenous economic and social elite for a place on the political stage.
. . . Most of the indigenous elite had opposed the creation of Pakistan. The conßict
between these two groups delayed the process of giving the country a permanent
and durable framework to the point that the economy came to a near collapse and




15. Looney and Frederiksen, ÒBudgetary Consequences of Defense Expenditures in Pakistan,Ó
p. 15.
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Burki notes that the second experiment with democracy, conducted between
1971 and 1977, saw the landed aristocracy battle with social groups that
wanted to be recognized as legitimate political players: ÒThe old establish-
ment led by large landlords showed little respect for the constitutional order










 In short, democratic governments in Pakistan have not created
the institutions needed to sustain growth, while military governments, though
providing temporary stability, are also unable to generate sustained growth




PakistanÕs economy expanded again in the 1980s, with the average annual
GDP growth rate of 6.1% only slightly below that of the 1960s. Total factor




 The countryÕs initial at-
tempts at market-oriented reforms, including deregulation and privatization,
no doubt contributed to increased efÞciency. One might imagine that the
1979 cutoff of economic and military aid to Pakistan by the United States
because of concerns over PakistanÕs nuclear program might have sup-
pressed growth during this period. But the sanctions against Pakistan were





Despite rapid growth, the economy showed an increasing number of struc-
tural weaknesses toward the end of the 1980s. These included (1) heavy regu-
lation of economic activity through price controls, industrial licensing, and
government ownership; (2) a trade regime with a high level of distortion-
creating protections, inhibiting competitiveness and export growth; (3) a weak
public-resource position owing to a narrow and inelastic revenue base, high
consumption expenditure, and inadequate development expenditure, resulting
in excessive budget deÞcits; (4) an inefÞcient Þnancial sector with mostly
public ownership, directed credit, and weak commercial banks; and (5) a high
and growing debt-service burden resulting from the countryÕs heavy reliance












Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism: Case 79—2 US v. Pakistan, Nuclear Missile Pro-
liferation
 















Once the ßow of foreign capital and external assistance ceased, it became
apparent that the growth rate of the 1980s was not sustainable. As Burki notes,
the country could have undertaken serious structural reforms to make eco-
nomic growth self-sustaining, improve the quality of its human resources
through education and training, improve the efÞciency of the economy, and




 ÒNone of this was done. However, the access to
billions of dollars of largely unaccountable capitalÑsince a good proportion
of it came from intelligence agenciesÑencouraged corruption on a vast scale.
It also encouraged a cavalier attitude towards the management of public sector
resources. All the institutions that had been developed in the 1960s to help







As a result of these factors, growth decelerated again in the 1990s, with aver-
age trend GDP growth of 3.9% per year for the period 1991—2001, but only
3.2% during the 1996—2001 period. The fall in total factor productivity was




0.5% per annum from 1996 to 2001. The
growth rate of the physical capital stock also decelerated somewhat to an aver-
age of 4.4%. Human capital growth decreased to 3% despite the acceleration
in labor force growth. The economy was simply not able to sustain the high
rates of growth needed to take off and to eradicate poverty.
Compounding the countryÕs problems during this period, the ongoing
sanctions by the United States against Pakistan stemming from the countryÕs
nuclear program were no longer offset by Afghanistan/Cold-War-related for-
eign aid. The net losses stemming from this factor have been estimated at




 In addition, the country suffered a sharp drop
in worker remittances in the early 1990s, stemming from the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait.
Summing up, it appears that Pakistan had two failed take-offs, one in the
1960s and one in the 1980s. These were periods during which growth and in-
vestment and, in the 1980s, total factor productivity, acceleratedÑonly to run
into constraints imposed by low savings rates, macroeconomic imbalances,
and lack of supporting institutional development and proper governance struc-
tures. In particular, the 1980s exposed the economyÕs dependence on favor-
able external circumstances.
 

















 Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism.
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Key Factors Limiting Economic 
Take-Off in Pakistan
 
William Easterly has termed PakistanÕs experience as an illustration of
Ògrowth without development.Ó Easterly contends that the countryÕs poor so-
cial indicators have lowered the productive potential of the economy and its




 His observations, along with the patterns of
total factor productivity, suggest possible explanations for PakistanÕs failed
take-offs together with a fairly respectable overall growth rate of 5.4% over
1961—2001. Namely, a certain degree of development and growth was attain-
able with a skilled managerial elite and unskilled workers, but over time, this
strategy generated diminishing returns, as human capital did not grow at the
same rate as the capital stock. Combined with weak governance and limited
economic reforms, this caused a slowdown in growth from the late 1980s to
the present.
More bluntly, Shahid Husain has attributed the countryÕs inability to sustain
high growth to the following factors:
 
¥ An increase in the role of the state has coincided with a decline in governance.
¥ Non-competitive political and economic regimes have resulted in rampant corrup-
tion and stagnationÑsubversion of competitiveness was the central feature of Paki-
stani governments.
¥ There has been a continuous redistribution of wealth in favor of privileged groups.
¥ A hard crust of economic monopoly has stißed new growth and creativity.
¥ An erosion in the provision of public services has resulted in a decline in the pub-
licÕs trust in government, which is seen as predatory. This, in turn, is linked to non-
payment of taxes, corruption in tax administration, and a massive increase in
borrowing.
¥ The quality of the civil bureaucracy is falling rapidly. A majority of civil servants
are not even paid a living wage. This is tantamount to an incentive for corruption.
¥ The irrelevance of the state in the lives of the people is exempliÞed by the total
breakdown of law and order.
¥ The inability and unwillingness of the state to discharge its social services have
meant a vacuum in social services. PakistanÕs literacy rate has remained almost









From this, Husain correctly concludes that little economic progress, let alone a
take-off, is possible until the government is able to reestablish its presence in
the political, social, and economic lives of its citizens.
 
24. William Easterly, ÒThe Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study
of PakistanÓ (Washington: World Bank, June 2001).
25. ÒPakistanÕs Future and U.S. Policy OptionsÓ (Washington: Center for Strategic & Interna-




These factors can all be grouped into a system characterized by the domi-
nance of diversion over production. As Aqdas Ali Kazmi notes in the following:
 
This dominance results in the unfettered exploitation of the real producers of goods
and services and unchecked accumulation of wealth and resources by the ÒdivertersÓ
in the society. The chief characteristics of the diversion based societies can be iden-
tiÞed as the unjust property rights, the outdated judicial and legal framework,
powerlessness of the working classes, the ascendancy of feudalistic norms and a




Finally, there is empirical evidence that the diversionary economy suffers
from low productivity capable of stißing long periods of high growth. Robert
Hall and Charles Jones have developed an index of anti-diversionary policy




 Two of the categories relate to the gov-
ernmentÕs role in protecting against private diversion: law and order and bu-
reaucratic quality. Three categories relate to the governmentÕs possible role as
a diverter: corruption, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of
contracts. Hall and Jones Þnd that an equal-weighted index is highly corre-
lated with output per worker. Bureaucratic quality, law and order, and corrup-





For its part, the Musharraf administration appears to have had a sound con-
ceptual grasp of the structural impediments to economic growth that have
built up over the years. Soon after taking power in October 1999, the new
government initiated a comprehensive macroeconomic stabilization pro-
gram, as well as a series of reforms designed to address many of the economic





SpeciÞcally, the strategy envisaged four key goals:
 
1. Macroeconomic stability and the restoration of a working relationship with inter-
national Þnancial institutions, mainly, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian De-
velopment Bank (ADB);
2. Structural reforms to remove distortions in the economy;
 














27. Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, ÒLevels of Economic Activity across Countries,Ó De-
partment of Economics, Stanford University Working Paper, January 7, 1997.
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3. Improving governance, especially in the economic sphere, and reviving key na-
tional institutions;
4. Poverty alleviation measures.
 
The main thrust of the Musharraf reforms is to improve not only the countryÕs
economy but its governance and key institutions as well. The agenda for im-
proving governance is based on the devolution of power, improved public Þ-
nancial management and accountability, anti-corruption measures, and civil
service, judicial, and police reforms.
The implicit interdependent priorities underlying this approach are straight-
forward: good governance, economic revival based on strong fundamen-
tals, freedom from debt, and social harmony. The overriding philosophy of
the Musharraf government is that distortions in the economy are great in-
hibitors in achieving these objectives and must be removed. The govern-
mentÕs economic team and IMF and World Bank staff shared MusharrafÕs
diagnosis of the problems confronting the economy and the prescriptions
required to Þx them.
The Musharraf reforms need to be seen as a process unfolding over time.
The Þrst phase is to restore growth through macroeconomic stability and mar-
ket reforms focused on increasing total factor productivity and globalization.
The second stage is to develop a governance structure capable of sustaining




IMF involvement in these reforms was not immediate. The relationship be-
tween Pakistan and the IMF in the early days of the Musharraf regime was
strained. The IMF and its major contributors did not take lightly the dismissal
of a democratically elected government and takeover by a military leader. In
addition, the new government had to inform the Fund about PakistanÕs misre-
porting of the ofÞcial deÞcit data for Þscal year 1998—99. As a result of these
factors and the failed programs of the 1990s, the government lacked credibil-
ity. The failed programs in the 1990s only compounded the FundÕs suspicion
that the country was incapable of delivering on its commitments.
Approximately one year after the military coup that had brought President
Musharraf to power in Pakistan, the executive board of the IMF approved a
standby credit of US$596 million. The program was to run until the end of
September 2001, supporting the governmentÕs economic program for 2000—01.
The program, completed on schedule, was aimed to move Pakistan onto a high
and sustainable growth path by strengthening its balance of payments position,
rebuilding ofÞcial reserves, and reducing public sector indebtedness. To support
these objectives, the government strengthened macroeconomic policies and, as




revenue mobilization, improving investor conÞdence, poverty alleviation, and
good governance. The IMF credit was subject to the following requirements:
 
¥ A reduction in the overall budget deÞcit in 2000—01 to 5.2% of GDP from 6.4% in
1999—2000, with further consolidation over the medium term. This was to be achieved
through increased tax collections, with a widening of the tax base, improved tax
administration, and strict expenditure controls. Because there is sufÞcient uncer-
tainty surrounding the short-term impact of revenue measures on the budgetary
position, the authorities should stand ready to take additional measures if revenues
fall short of expectations.
¥ A spending boost of nearly one-third for poverty reduction and decreases in less-
productive spending.
¥ An increase in gross ofÞcial reserves from $1.114 billion at the start of the program
to $1.74 billion at the end of June 2001, equivalent to 7.3 weeks of imports of goods
and services, to be achieved through a ßexible exchange rate policy, monetary
tightening, Þscal adjustment, substantial exceptional Þnancing, increased exports,
and sharply reduced private sector capital outßows brought about by a restoration
of investor conÞdence.
 
Adequate expenditure control mechanisms were put in place to help ensure
that the defense budget remained within the agreed limit. The IMF terms were
quite strict, but after the many failures of the 1990s, Pakistan was in a very
poor bargaining position. The country was on the verge of a serious Þnancial
collapse, and the new government had assumed power with a commitment to
avert such a crisis.
The IMFÕs Stand-by Agreement (SBA) was fully implemented without any
problems. The countryÕs improved standing with the IMF enabled the govern-
ment to qualify for another IMF program, a three-year Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF), which was approved in 2001 and is well underway.
As noted above, the Musharraf administrationÕs economic strategy from the
beginning has been relatively straightforward: First stabilize the economy and
then restructure. It was assumed that growth would return with stabilization.
There are several implicit assumptions here: (1) PakistanÕs tricky economic
situation could not be addressed unless the donor community helped reduce
the countryÕs burden of debt; (2) to get donors to help Pakistan, the country
had to Þrst successfully complete an IMF stabilization program; and (3) once
the burden of debt had lightened, Pakistan would have the resources needed to
jump-start the economy.
This strategy was predicated on creating an environment that would attract
high inßows of private foreign investment. Without these foreign funds to
supplement low domestic rates of savings, the country would not be able to re-
turn to respectable rates of economic growth. The presumption was that once
economic growth was reestablished in Pakistan, there would likely be adequate
funds to combat terrorism on two fronts: (1) poverty reduction and improved
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governance; and (2) increased allocations for security and force moderniza-
tion. With improved growth and modernization of institutions, the attractive-
ness of terrorism would diminish. In turn, this would create an environment
more conducive to further inßows of capital. In this manner, the IMF pro-
grams and the war on terrorism would complement each other.
 
Initial Assessments
Evaluating the countryÕs recent economic performance is difÞcult because a
mixed picture emerges. Or, as Saeed Ahmad Qureshi notes, objectivity on re-
cent developments in Pakistan has been colored by divergent perceptionsÑ
the product of a sharply polarized political environment.28 The schools of
thought that deliver these judgments fall into two broad categories: the take-
off school and the structuralist school.29
The Take-Off School
With the above considerations in mind, the take-off school, or supporters of
the Musharraf Reforms30 and the IMF,31 point to a number of recent successes.
Most important, economic growth has been exceeding targets and is expected
to reach 6.4% in 2003 (July—June). Growth is broad-based, but most pro-
nounced in the export-oriented large scale manufacturing sectors. Despite in-
creased domestic demand, growth is occurring in an environment of relatively
low inßation (6% per annum).
SigniÞcantly, many of the countryÕs external problems are lessening, with
strong export growth helping to maintain a balance of payments equilibrium
surplus of about 2% of GDP. By early 2004, PakistanÕs ofÞcial foreign ex-
change reserves had grown to about $11 billion. In 2004, the countryÕs im-
proved external position has enabled the authorities to reduce PakistanÕs
public and publicly guaranteed debt by around four percentage points to 43%.
A good indicator of progress was PakistanÕs return to the international capital
markets through the issue of a $500 million Þve-year Eurobond. The govern-
mentÕs budgetary position has also improved considerably, with revenues in
2004 exceeding expectations.
Based on these favorable developments, the government has conÞdently
forecast rising rates of growth over the next several years, led by an expansion
28. Saeed Ahmad Qureshi, ÒTwo Views on Economic Performance,Ó Dawn (June 9, 2003),
,http://www.dawn.com/2003/06/09/ebr1.htm..
29. Stressing inflexibilities and rigidities in the economy.
30. See, for example, Ashfaque H. Khan, ÒThe Economy at Take-Off Stage,Ó Dawn (May 5,
2003), ,http://www.dawn.com/2003/05/05/ebr3.htm..
31. ÒPakistan: Eighth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduc-
tion and Growth FacilityÓ (Washington: International Monetary Fund, July 2004).
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in textile manufacturing and construction. In short, the take-off school con-
tends that macroeconomic stability has been achieved to a large extent, invest-
ment and growth are rising, interest rates are falling, inßation is low, private
sector credit has picked up, both domestic and external debts are declining,
exports are picking up, tax collection is rising, the current account balance is
in surplus, and the exchange rate is stable.32
The Structuralist Interpretation
The structuralist school acknowledges the improved economic picture noted
above. However, structuralists contend that many of these results simply de-
rived from unusual external events and cannot be directly attributable to the
governmentÕs reform programs. In particular, they contend that the countryÕs
improved reserve position and reduced indebtedness have come about largely
because of a windfall following the events of September 11. Other points em-
phasized by this school are discussed here.
The structural fault lines of the economy have persisted, and even wors-
ened. Social indicators such as the United NationsÕ Human Development
Index (HDI) place Pakistan near the bottom of world rankings, along with some
of the African countries.33 Infant mortality per 1,000 live births is 136, com-
pared with 107 for Nepal, 96 for Bangladesh, 83 for India, and 18 for Sri Lanka.
Studies by the ADB show that more than 12 million people were added to
the ranks of the poor in Pakistan between 1993 and 1999.34 During this period,
the proportion of the population below the poverty line worsened from 26% in
1993 to 32% in 1999. Despite rapid growth in the last several years, there is
little indication that the level of poverty has been signiÞcantly reduced. Thus,
it would not be an exaggeration to say that more than one-third of the coun-
tryÕs population is currently living in poverty.
PakistanÕs primary school enrollment rate is the lowest in South Asia. Edu-
cational expenditures have fallen from 1.8% of GDP in 1998 to 1.6% in 2001Ñ
also the lowest level in South Asia. At 7%, unemployment has reached a
record level. If underemployment is factored in, the Þgure increases to 10.4%.
On the macroeconomic front, structuralists often cite the poor record of
growth, 3.3%, in the Þrst three years of the Musharraf government. In addi-
tion, they note that the ratio of investment to GDP has declined from 20% in
the early 1990s to 15% in the early 2000s, further dropping to 13.8% in 2002.
They attribute improvement in large-scale manufacturing production mainly
32. Khan, ÒThe Economy at Take-Off Stage.Ó
33. Qureshi, ÒTwo Views on Economic Performance.Ó
34. ADB, Poverty in Pakistan: Issues, Causes, and Institutional Responses (Manila: Asian
Development Bank, August 2002).
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to the expansion in the output of automobiles and electronics, whose demand
has been spurred by the provision of consumer credit.35
Critics of the Musharraf reforms36 also contend that the programÕs whole
orientation is inappropriate: in addition to the growing level of poverty noted
above, 60% of the population has no access to education, 50% has no access
to basic health services, and 50% lacks access to sanitation facilities. At the
same time, Pakistan has one of the worldÕs highest population growth rates, at
2.8%. The growing unemployment of youth has led to their increased frustra-
tion and, more important, has created an environment upon which radical
Islamists have been able to capitalize, as evidenced by their striking gains in
the last election, in 2002.
In sum, while many macroeconomic stabilization indices targeted by the
IMF show encouraging improvement, many critical indicators of the actual
standard of living of the great majority of the populationÑpoverty rate, GDP
growth, investment, health and education levels, and so onÑhave not shown
much of an advance, and in some cases have deteriorated. This has lead the
structuralists to conclude that the reforms are fundamentally ßawed because
the IMF and Pakistan have been unable to learn from past mistakes, most no-
tably redistributing income toward elites while failing to promote economic
growth and attack poverty.37
Members of the take-off school note that empirical studies on PakistanÕs
poverty largely point to low growth during the 1990s as the main source of
povertyÕs rapid increase. Haroon Jamal, for instance, notes that most poverty
growth following the 1988 Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) package
from the World Bank and IMF up to 1999 was caused by low economic
growth, as opposed to redistribution effects.38 With the population increasing
at 2.8% per annum, the recent 5.1% increase in GDP translates into per capita
income growth of 2.6% per year. The general rule for developing countries is
that the economy must grow at twice the rate of population increase to begin
reducing the incidence of poverty.39 This bolsters the take-off schoolÕs argu-
ment that the chief objective of economic policy should be higher sustained
rates of growth.
35. Jawaid Bokhari, ÒConsumer Focused Growth: ÔFrozen Mind-SetsÕ,Ó Dawn (August 25,
2003), ,http://www.dawn.com/2003/08/25/ebr4.htm..
36. Masooda Bano, ÒWhat Reforms?Ó News International (November 15, 2002), ,http://
www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2002-daily/15-11-2002/oped/o2.htm..
37. James Vreeland, ÒPakistanÕs Debt of Gratitude,Ó Foreign Policy (March/April 2002), pp.
72—73.
38. Haroon Jamal, Poverty and Inequality during the Adjustment Decade: Empirical Findings
from Household Surveys (Karachi: Social Policy and Development Center, 2003).
39. Shahid Javed Burki, ÒOn the Verge of Take-Off?Ó Dawn (July 15, 2003), ,http://
www.dawn.com/2003/07/15/op.htm#2..
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The ADBÕs position is that poor governance is the key underlying cause of
poverty in Pakistan.40 Corruption and political instability, both manifestations
of governance problems, have resulted in waning business conÞdence, deteri-
orating economic growth, declining public expenditures on basic entitlements,
low efÞciency in delivery of public services, and a serious undermining of
state institutions and the rule of law, which in turn translate into lower invest-
ment levels and growth.
The effects of poor governance have compounded the economic causes of
rising poverty, such as a decline in the GDP growth rate, increasing indebted-
ness, inßation, falling public investment, and the poor state of physical infra-
structure. At the same time, social factors, such as the highly unequal distribution
of land, low levels of human development, and persistent ethnic and sectar-
ian conßicts, are also obstacles to the achievement of long-term sustained
development.
Still, a careful reading of the governmentÕs reform programs suggests that
they are roughly consistent with the ADBÕs poverty assessment. Foremost among
the governmentÕs governance-related reforms is its Devolution Plan. Under
this plan, delivery of services in the social and other poverty-focused sectors
has been decentralized, with elected local governments given the mandate and
responsibility to manage and run these services. The government has also in-
troduced important reforms to improve the functioning of judicial institutions
and enhance equitable access for the citizenry to justice.
In sum, the structuralists make a number of good points; however, the
Musharraf reforms appear sound and well-intended. Still, the jury is still out
on the reformsÕ ultimate success. Accelerating growth rates may be driven by
a series of favorable external, exogenous events, rather than by the reforms
themselves. Clearly, the inßow of foreign aid, higher remittances, and debt re-
scheduling by the Paris Club of bilateral donors, following PakistanÕs decision
to join the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, have all given the economy a
signiÞcant boost that is unlikely to be repeated on a sustained basis.
Given the difÞculty Pakistan has had over the years sustaining high rates of
growth, the reforms will no doubt be ultimately judged on the quality of the
institutions put in place. Are these institutions capable of fairly resolving many
of the conßicts that have repeatedly derailed the economy? Will they permit
continuity in economic policy? Will they strengthen democracy, enabling all
segments of society better access to public services and opportunities? Will
they enable the country to Þnally have a successful economic transition to
high sustained growth?
40. Poverty in Pakistan: Issues, Causes, and Institutional Responses.
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Links to Pakistan’s War on Terrorism
One thing is clear. The progress made in implementing the Musharraf reforms
will have tremendous implications for terrorism in Pakistan. Burki notes that
the important question is not what kind of presence al-Qaeda has established
in Pakistan. Rather, Òthe real issue is how some segments of society can be
weaned away from the type of thinking represented by al-Qaeda. Unless that
is done, Pakistan will not be able to achieve either economic or political sta-
bility.Ó41 At issue, then, is which objectives the reform process should focus
on? Does terrorism breed within an environment of dire poverty, as is now
quite prevalent in Pakistan? Or is it more likely to take hold in an environment
of dashed expectations and limited opportunities for economic success, not
only for ordinary people but for the educated as well? This is an environment
also experienced by many Pakistanis. Or is terrorism simply a reßection of
militant Islam, stemming from the rapid expansion of madrassahs?42 In 1947,
about 150 madrassahs existed in Pakistan. By 1971, this number had increased
to 562. Another 30 years later, there were about 20,000.
Initial post-9/11 speculation has focused on poverty and low educational at-
tainment as underlying causes of terrorism. With time and more rigorous re-
search, a different picture has emerged. Alan Krueger and Jitka MaleckovaÕs
detailed in-depth review of the evidence, for instance, provides little reason
for optimism that a reduction in poverty in and of itself, or an increase in edu-
cational attainment, would meaningfully reduce international terrorism.43 Their
main Þnding is that any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism
is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terror-
ism as a direct response to limited market opportunities or ignorance, they
suggest that terrorism is a response to political conditions and long-standing
feelings, either perceived or real, of indignity and frustration.
The growth and productivity patterns noted above certainly suggest that
Pakistan is a classic example of a country fulÞlling Krueger and MaleckovaÕs
description of a terrorist breeding ground. Large segments of the population
have become weary and frustrated with the countryÕs lack of economic progress,
especially now that the Indian economy is pulling away with a much higher
and accelerating rate of growth. The countryÕs patterns of growth, productivity,
41. Shahid Javed Burki, ÒTerrorism & Development,Ó Dawn (May 21, 2002), ,http://
www.dawn.com/2002/05/21/op.htm#1..
42. Robert Looney, ÒA U.S. Strategy for Achieving Stability in Pakistan: Expanding Educa-
tional Opportunities,Ó Strategic Insight (September 2, 2002), ,http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/
rsepResources/si/sept02/southAsia.asp..
43. Alan Kureger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, Political Violence, and Terrorism:
Is There a Causal Connection? (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July
2002).
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and institutional failure seem to Þt a more formal model of terrorist develop-
ment recently developed by Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda.44
Failed Take-Offs, Transitions, and Terrorism
Bremer and KasardaÕs main conceptual construct is what they term ÒThe New
Second World.Ó This is a group of about three dozen countries that have
reached middle-income status over the past two decades and are now in the
midst of accomplishing critical economic and political transitions as they
move from the third world to the Þrst.
The New Second World transition has three phases (see Figure 1). The Þrst
or early phase typically begins when a low-income country starts to industri-
alize rapidly, launching an agrarian-industrial transition and the complex
transformations, urbanization, income growth, and economic diversiÞcation
figure 1 New Second World Transitions
44. Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda, ÒThe Origins of Terror: Implications for U.S. Foreign
Policy,Ó Milken Institute Review (Fourth Quarter 2002), pp. 34—48.
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accompanying it. A process similar but not identical to RostowÕs take-off oc-
curs if growth continues for a decade or more. In that case, the country reaches
the middle New Second World phase. In the second phase, industrial produc-
tion per capita may now be around three times what it was when the transition
started, and growth in low-value-added manufacturing is rapid and sustained.
Incomes rise and a middle class emerges. Bremer and Kasarda note that if this
middle phase continues for 10 to 20 years, the country would likely reach the
advanced phase, often a time of recurring economic crisis and political tur-
moil. Countries currently in this advanced group include Brazil, Poland, Rus-
sia, and Turkey.
Since Pakistan is in the Þrst stage along with countries such as Egypt, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia (Figure 1), our attention is focused mainly on the problems
encountered by that group. These countries have failed to move forward to the
middle stage, largely because of growth-limiting policies and institutional ri-
gidities. As Bremer and Kasarda note, ÒHistory suggests that failure to make
steady progress through the New Second World transitionÕs early phase to the
middle period is extremely dangerous. If the transition stalls hereÑas it did in
post-World War I Russia, and as it has now in much of the Middle EastÑ
failure can lead to revolution and Al Qaeda-style international violence.Ó45
The one thing that the nations stuck in the early phase have in common is slow-
ness in adopting choice-based systems. Bremer and Kasarda deÞne Òchoice-
basedÓ systems as encompassing both market-based economies and democratic
political institutions and organizations.46
No indexes of the prevalence of choice-based systems exist. However, the
annual publication of an Economic Freedom Index by Gwartney and Associ-
ates (1995) is no doubt a good proxy.47 Stripped to its essentials, economic
freedom is concerned with property rights and choice. It follows that to mea-
sure freedom, one must Þnd appropriate measures of the ways in which these
elements are restricted by governments.
Gwartney et al. chose 17 such measures in four broad areas: (1) money and
inßation, (2) government operations and regulations, (3) takings (levies)
and discriminatory taxation, and (4) international exchange. Indexes vary
based on the weights given to the 17 components. Countries are ranked from 0
(no freedom) to 10 (extremely high levels of freedom). On this basis, Pakistan
improved from a very low 2.3 in 1975 to 5.4, or mid-range, by the mid-1990s.
The improvement in the countryÕs ranking was not based on across-the-board
improvements but on improvements in just a few components in the index:
45. Ibid., p. 36.
46. Ibid., p. 37.
47. James Gwartney and Robert A Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 (Vancou-
ver: Fraser Institute, 2003).
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Marginal tax rates were reduced, and the black market exchange premium was
eliminated.48 There were no appreciable improvements in the government
operations components.
In sum, there has been some movement toward increased economic free-
dom in Pakistan over the past several decades. However, it is clear that if the
country is to escape from its initial stage of transition, it must not only attack
corruption but also improve its bureaucratic capabilities, regulatory environ-
ment, and legal system. Historically, the unfortunate fact is that despite the
high payoff to economic liberalization, the process in Pakistan has proceeded
unevenly across the various sectors. Clearly, shaky governments and powerful
interests have caused the reform process to proceed at an uncertain pace.
Implications for U.S. Aid
While the analysis above makes a strong case for PakistanÕs terrorism problems
being an outgrowth of widespread frustration and anger over the countryÕs inabil-
ity to break out of the Þrst phase of the New Second World, the two other com-
monly cited sources of terrorismÑpoverty and militant IslamÑno doubt are
contributing factors and need to be addressed. However, it is unlikely that focus-
ing on them exclusively will signiÞcantly reduce the attractiveness of terrorism.
Instead, assistance needs to focus on the policy changes and institution-
building required to navigate out of the Þrst development stage currently trap-
ping the country. Here, United States aid can make a signiÞcant contribution
by assisting the Pakistani governmentÕs attack on the root causes of terrorism,
those elements that deÞne the diversionary economy and currently suppress
economic freedom. In targeting these areas, contributions (see the dotted lines
in Figure 2) toward reducing poverty and the numbers of Islamic militants
would occur simultaneously. Ordinarily, expanded efforts at institution building
and bolstered anti-corruption programs might face strong domestic obstacles.
However, in PakistanÕs case, the Musharraf anti-corruption and institutional
strengthening reforms are already in place and appropriate for the war against
terrorism; they simply need to be adequately funded and implemented. Be-
cause of this, the United States has not been perceived as trying to impose a
foreign set of institutions on the country. The overall guideline for allocating
assistance should be simple and direct: Is this program assisting Pakistan in
moving toward a choice-based system?
This approach is consistent with the objectives laid out in PakistanÕs new
Five Year Plan to raise the GDP growth rate to 6% by June 30, 2005.49 To
48. Robert Looney, ÒPakistanÕs Progress Towards Economic Freedom,Ó Contemporary South
Asia, 6:1 (1997), pp. 79—98.
49. M. B. Naqvi, ÒThe New Five Year Plan,Ó News International (January 20, 2003), ,http://
www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jan2003-weekly/busrev-20-01-2003/p2.htm..








































achieve this, the government has targeted six key areas: (1) political stability;
(2) regional stability; (3) improved law and order; (4) continued Þscal respon-
sibility, with tight control over budget deÞcits; (5) transparency and consis-
tency in economic policies; and (6) full implementation of structural reforms.
The key remaining issue surrounds the type of assistance Pakistan should
receive: Should it be in the form of aid, with a stipulated rate of interest or an
outright grant? Here, the U.S. should consider the recommendation of the
Meltzer Report50 for substituting grants for aid as a more effective means of
monitoring projects and providing performance incentives to the recipients.
For the type of institutional loans under consideration here, the situation is more
complicated because output is harder to measure, and there would be no real
scope for competitive bids to provide the contracted outputs.
Traditional aid often failed in these situations because there was no means
to enforce penalties for failure to perform and often no real incentives on the
part of the recipient country to continue or even start the reform process. One
alternative in the current context would be to make short-term concessional
loans conditional on institutional reform. Progress, as judged by annual inde-
pendent audit, could be rewarded with an extension of the concessional loan.
Poor implementation would trigger immediate repayment. Because the grant
element of a concessional loan increases as the loanÕs maturity increases, the
Pakistani government would have a real incentive to follow through to success-
ful implementation. As an added incentive, a clause could be included convert-
ing the concessional loan into a grant upon successful completion of the reform.
Conclusions
PakistanÕs economic future, while brighter than at any time in years, is far from
secure. As noted above, the critical question is whether the country will be
able to build on the reforms undertaken since 1999. The reforms appear to be the
correct response to both the economic malaise of the 1990s as well as to
the increasing terrorist threat from within. If successfully implemented, these
reforms should enable the country to sustain take-off and transformation into a
modern economic society. In turn, this transformation would tend to stiße the
growth of domestic terrorists and terrorist threats to the Pakistani economy
and society. Furthermore, implementation of the reforms should present no
real conceptual or, with proper management, insurmountable Þnancial challenge.
From an economic perspective, the success of the reforms largely relies on
investors, both domestic and foreign, taking advantage of the new opportuni-
ties afforded by the macroeconomic stabilization programs. Ultimately therefore,
50. Alan H. Meltzer, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, March 2000).
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the key element for success is the political stability needed to nurture the re-
form process and maintain continuity of policies. Because of doubts over po-
litical stability or the political will of the government to press ahead with the
reform program, seasoned Pakistani observers have put forward few optimis-
tic scenarios for the country. Even here ÒoptimisticÓ is usually in the context of
a calamity avoided, rather than anything positive occurring. For example, in
2002, Stephen Cohen suggested probabilities for some of the standard scenarios
as follows:51
¥ The breakup of Pakistan is very unlikely for the foreseeable future.
¥ The triumph of radical Islam in Pakistan is as improbable as IslamÕs dissolution there.
¥ The only likely dramatic change in Pakistani politics would be the emergence of a
demagogic or radical political movement.
¥ The full restoration of democratic government and the efÞcient rebuilding of the
Pakistani state is a future that would fall somewhere between the improbable and
the impossible.
¥ The present arrangement of a military-led or -inßuenced government will prevail
indeÞnitely but will not transform Pakistan.
By 2003, Cohen appeared to be taking the threat from radical Islam more seri-
ously, although he still did not see a grave threat, at least in the near term.52
That leaves the last item above, the status quo, as the likely political envi-
ronment for reform in the foreseeable future. Here lies the real dilemma and
main source of uncertainty over the degree of implementation of the reforms
and thus their ultimate success in transforming the economy. Will economic
success enable the military to break down the barriers limiting PakistanÕs
transformation? Will the military even want to continue pursuing the reforms
if setbacks begin to slow the expansion?
Further complicating the situation, the Pakistan military has long given
strategic and overt support to the countryÕs Islamic fundamentalists, but that
policy appears to be backÞring as religious radicals mount a challenge to cen-
tral power. As it stands, Islamic and secular opposition parties are disrupting
much of parliamentÕs work. This, coupled with President MusharrafÕs failure to
win parliamentary support for the militaryÕs continuing political dominance, has
led to fears that he may be on the verge of dissolving democratic legislatures
and reimposing military rule. ÒThe present army leadership has developed utter
contempt for civilians and democracy,Ó says a retired general who used to be
close to Musharraf. ÒItÕs a very dangerous situation for Pakistan and the region.Ó53
51. Stephen Philip Cohen, ÒThe Nation and the State of Pakistan,Ó Washington Quarterly, 25:3
(Summer 2002), pp. 119—20.
52. Stephen Philip Cohen, ÒThe Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,Ó ibid., 26:3 (Summer 2003), pp. 7—26.
53. Quoted in Ahmed Rashid, ÒMusharrafÕs Morass,Ó Far Eastern Economic Review (June 19,
2003).
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Beside the threat to democracy, the current political crisis in Pakistan will
continue to deter both foreign and domestic investment. In fact, an increas-
ingly asked question is, ÒWhy is domestic investment not coming up in siz-
able measure despite the steadily improving environment for it?Ó54 Economic
success to date has no doubt been aided by a set of very favorable, and prob-
ably not sustainable, external developments.
In this regard, a structuralist, Farhan Bokhari, sounds a very ominous note:
The true litmus test of PakistanÕs economic future lies not across the robustly rising
share prices on the Karachi Stock Market, but in fact across the countryÕs invest-
ment horizon where persistent lethargy is a telling indicator of times to come. In a
country where direct investment remains lackluster and prospective new foreign and
domestic investors remain wary on account of reasons ranging from internal secu-
rity conditions to the danger of recurring political uncertainty to the many gaps in
facilitation of entrepreneurs, claiming success in turning around the economy must
remain in danger of being premature.55
Similarly, says take-off school advocate Burki:56
Given PakistanÕs past history, there is a real danger that politics may cause the econ-
omy to stumble again. And, given the fact that after three years of hard work by Islam-
abad the economy is on the verge of a possible take-off, it would be unfortunate if
this opportunity is sacriÞced at the altar of politics. If the military under the direction
of President Musharraf has to choose between economic stability and growth on the
one hand and a quick return to democracy on the other, it must choose the former.
54. Sultan Ahmed, ÒWhy the Private Sector Is Not Investing,Ó Dawn (August 11, 2003),
,http://www.dawn.com/2003/08/11/ebr3.htm., also provides a number of reasons for the reluc-
tance of private investors to increase their capital formation in Pakistan.
55. Farhan Bokhari, ÒFailure to Agree,Ó News International (August 24, 2003), ,http://
www.jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2003-daily/21-08-2003/oped/o3.htm..
56. Shahid Javed Burki, ÒSome Possible Pitfalls,Ó Dawn (July 22, 2003), ,http://www.
dawn.com/2003/07/22/op.htm..
